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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1.  In 1906, a major reduction in tribal land holdings occurred when the Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation was allotted.  In conjunction with allotment of the Reservation, Congress directed 
the Secretary of the Interior “to sell or dispose of unalloted lands.”  Act of June 21, 1906, 34 
Stat. 325, 335.  “The rationale for the policy [of selling surplus lands] was that most lands 
remaining after allotment was completed were not needed by the tribes.”  Cohen’s Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law 613-14 (Renard Strickland ed. 1982). 
The Tribe accuses the State of “overstat[ing] the effect of the Coeur d’Alene Allotment 
Act” because while the Act caused the “Tribe to lose ownership of some land to individual 
Indian allottees and non-Indian purchasers of surplus lands, the Tribe still retained the 
Reservation’s unsold and unallotted land for its beneficial use.”  Tribe Resp. Br. 36.  This 
statement, while facially true, omits to disclose that the unsold lands amounted to 12,878 acres, 
or less than 4% of the 345,000 acres within the Reservation’s exterior boundaries.1  As a result, 
homesteaders occupied almost all of the land along the twelve tributary streams that provide 
spawning and rearing habit for adfluvial fish species harvested in Coeur d’Alene Lake.  See R. 
2214 (1911 map showing land opened to homesteading).2   
The small amount of land held for the benefit of the Tribe along the twelve tributary 
streams is a critical fact in this case.  It is not an overstatement to assert that the Tribe owns little, 
                                                 
1  See Act of May 19, 1958, 72 Stat. 121 (restoring the unsold 12,878 acres to tribal 
ownership).  The Tribe also retained 4,140-5,220 acres of submerged lands under navigable 
waterways as communal property.  See R. 0548-49 (Affidavit of David B. Shaw). 
2  Adfluvial fish species live in the Lake as adults, but travel up tributary streams to 
spawn; juvenile fish either migrate to the Lake directly, or reside in the streams for several years 
before returning to the Lake.  R. 0577. 
REPLY BRIEF OF STATE OF IDAHO 
DOCKET NO. 45381-2017  Page 2 
and in many cases none, of the fish habitat that it seeks to preserve in the twelve non-navigable 
streams.  Indeed, the map that the Tribe filed under Protective Order, R. 3692, amply 
demonstrates the lack of tribal lands along the twelve streams even after recent acquisitions of 
land by the Tribe, many of which have not been taken into trust by the United States.3 
2.  On those portions of the twelve streams owned by, or held in trust for, the Tribe, the 
United States claims water for both instream flows and wetland maintenance.  In the letter 
accompanying its claims, the United States clarified that "[t]o the extent [the wetland] claims 
concern riparian areas along streams subject to Instream Flow claims . . . the United States does 
not intend to double a claim to the same surface water.  Instead, the United States is providing 
two separate justifications for the same water flows that provide instream fish habitat and support 
riparian vegetation."  R. 0011.  If this Court determines that protection of fish habitat was a 
primary purpose of the Reservation, the wetland maintenance claims will provide such protection 
on those stream segments held in trust for the Tribe, regardless of what action this Court takes 
with regard to the State’s assertion that the instream flow claims on the twelve streams 
dominated by non-Indian lands should be dismissed.  
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE 1887 AND 1889 AGREEMENTS SUPERSEDED THE 1873 EXECUTIVE ORDER AND 
EMBODIED THE PARTIES’ UNDERSTANDING THAT PROMOTION OF AGRICULTURE WAS 
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE REDUCED RESERVATION.      
                                                 
3 In United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984),  the court did not consider 
land “reacquired,” for purposes of implying reserved water rights, until the land had been 
“reacquired by the Tribe and returned to trust status.”  Id. at 1361 (emphasis added); see also In 
re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 
76, 84, 114, (Wyo. 1988) (implying reserved water rights for lands “later reacquired, in trust for 
the Tribes”).    
REPLY BRIEF OF STATE OF IDAHO 
DOCKET NO. 45381-2017  Page 3 
In 1873, the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was set aside by Executive Order, R. 2031, using 
the boundaries specified in an unratified agreement with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.  R. 2141 
(Agreement).  In 1885, the Tribe sent a petition seeking negotiations so “that their present 
reserve may be confirmed to them.”  R. 2042.  In 1887, the Tribe and the United States 
negotiated an agreement to set aside the lands within the 1873 Executive Order Reservation “as 
Indian land and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.”  R. 2187.  Congress expressed concern 
about the extent of submerged lands included within the Reservation, R. 2055, and ordered new 
negotiations.  Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 980, 1002.  “[T]he main purpose of the new 
negotiations was to regain from the Tribe whatever submerged lands it was willing to sell.” 
United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067, 1077 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000).  The boundaries of the Coeur 
d’Alene Reservation were diminished by an agreement concluded September 9, 1889, and the 
1887 and 1889 Agreements were ratified in the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989, 1027. 4   
The first question presented in this appeal is whether the 1887 and 1889 Agreements, 
considered together, established new purposes for use of the Tribe’s diminished land base, or 
simply ratified the purposes of the 1873 Executive Order.  The purposes of the 1887 and 1889 
Agreements, and the implications of such purposes for establishment of water rights, are 
independent of the Tribe’s title to submerged lands under navigable waters within the 
Reservation.  As established in Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (Idaho II), Congress, 
in its actions occurring before the date of statehood on July 3, 1890, recognized the inclusion of 
submerged lands in the 1873 Reservation, and affirmed the Tribe’s title to such lands.  Nothing 
in the 1887 and 1889 Agreements altered such intent, because Congress, in its pre-statehood acts, 
                                                 
4  Contrary to the assertions of the United States and the Tribe, the term “diminish” 
applies generally to any reduction in a Reservation’s boundaries.  See United States v. Idaho, 95 
F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1115 (D. Idaho 1998) (“[t]he northern boundary of the diminished reservation 
was drawn so as to bisect the Lake”).   
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had indicated its intent that “they remain tribal reservation lands barring agreement to the 
contrary.”  Id. at 280.  Such agreement occurred in 1889, when the Tribe agreed to “cede the 
northern portion of the reservation, including two-thirds of Lake Coeur d’Alene, in exchange for 
$500,000.”  Id. at 269-70.   
Idaho II establishes that it was Congress’s intent that the submerged lands under Coeur 
d’Alene Lake and the St. Joe River remain part of the Reservation.  But, in reaching that 
decision, the Court did not find it necessary to determine whether Congress, in approving the 
1887 and 1889 Agreements, ratified the hunting and fishing purposes of the 1873 Executive 
Order.  As the United States points out (U.S. Resp. Br. 13-14), the State asserted in the Idaho II 
litigation that no such ratification occurred.  But the Court never resolved the issue, as explained 
in more detail in the Ninth Circuit decision approved in Idaho II: 
The State's argument that the district court should have determined the purpose of 
the reservation as understood by Congress (rather than the Executive), and as so 
understood in 1889 (rather than 1873) lacks support in the case law. In [United 
States v.] Alaska, [521 U.S. 1 (1997)] where the Supreme Court relied heavily on 
the purpose of the reserves at issue, the Court did not require either that Congress 
itself apprehend the purpose or that the purpose be extant at the time of 
congressional action.  …  What mattered was that Congress recognized that the 
executive reservation included submerged lands, not that it knew or 
acknowledged the executive purpose in reserving them.  …  Thus, it is irrelevant 
that Congress may have believed the Tribe to have wholly or mainly converted to 
an agricultural lifestyle by 1889. 
United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d at 1075-76 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Idaho II courts never 
determined whether the purposes of the diminished Reservation that remained after 
implementation of the 1887 and 1889 Agreements were the same as those of the 1873 Executive 
Order.  It was not necessary because the submerged lands remained part of the Reservation 
regardless of whether the parties to the Agreements intended hunting and fishing to be a primary 
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purpose of the diminished Reservation or whether hunting and fishing were merely permitted 
activities.   
Given the holdings in Idaho II, this Court cannot infer an intent that hunting and fishing 
remain a primary purpose of the Reservation merely because the diminished Reservation 
included submerged lands.  Determination of such purpose entails two inquiries:  (1) did the 
1891 Act supersede the prior Executive Order, and (2) if so, did the 1891 Act encourage reliance 
on hunting and fishing, or merely permit hunting and fishing to continue within the 1891 
boundaries?   
1. The Court Need Not Find an Intent to “Abrogate” the Earlier Purpose of 
Hunting and Fishing in Order to Conclude that the Primary Purpose of the 
1887 and 1889 Agreements was to Promote Agriculture.   
The United States and the Tribe contest the notion that the 1887 and 1889 Agreements 
supersede the 1873 Executive Order by asserting that the Executive Order could be superseded 
only if Congress acted affirmatively to repudiate or abrogate it.  See, e.g., Tribe Resp. Br. 10 
(“[t]here is nothing in the text of the Agreements that could have been understood by the Tribe to 
mean that those Agreements were abrogating the purposes of the Reservation”).  In support of 
this assertion, the Tribe cites the statement in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986), 
which notes that the Court has traditionally “required that Congress' intention to abrogate Indian 
treaty rights be clear and plain.”  Dion and the cases cited therein, however, address unilateral 
congressional extinguishment of rights guaranteed to a tribe by treaty or agreement.  Here, the 
1887 and 1889 Agreements were not unilateral congressional actions—they were negotiated at 
arms-length with tribal leaders who demonstrated sophisticated bargaining techniques.  Because 
the parties were acting for their mutual benefit, the concept of unilateral abrogation is simply 
inapplicable.  Instead, the proper path is to apply the normal canons of construction applicable to 
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agreements with Indian tribes.  Doing so, it is obvious that the parties  mutually agreed to 
encourage agricultural uses on the reserved lands.  In contrast, while the Tribe retained the 
implied right to hunt and fish on its lands, such activities were not affirmatively encouraged, 
either on the face of the Agreements or in the discussions leading thereto.  In similar 
circumstances, other courts have concluded that primary purposes were those affirmatively 
encouraged by agreement with the Tribe, and secondary purposes are those activities merely 
permitted within the Reservation.  See Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 97, (finding hunting to be merely a 
permissive use of reservation lands even in the face of a treaty provision mentioning hunting).  
Moreover, it is hardly revolutionary to suggest that the purposes of a Reservation should 
be established by looking to agreements made with the Tribe rather than preceding executive 
orders.  This principle was acknowledged, in City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 145 Idaho 497, 180 P.3d 
1048 (2008), which held that the cession of a portion of the Fort Hall Reservation and 
accompanying federal legislation did not include a grant water rights.  The Fort Hall Reservation 
was initially set aside by executive order in 1867, and “[t]he boundaries and terms of the 
Reservation were established the next year in the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger.  Id. at 498, 180 
P.3d at 1049.  Despite the earlier executive order, the Court acknowledged that “the Tribe in this 
case impliedly received the water rights necessary to sustain the purposes of their reservation 
with the treaty establishing the Reservation.”  Id. at 507, 180 P.3d at 1058. 
City of Pocatello acknowledges that when the United States and a tribe enter into an 
agreement addressing the purpose and use of reservation lands the terms of that agreement 
establish the purposes mutually agreed upon by the parties.  And, as shown in Winters v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), such examination is particularly appropriate when the agreement is 
the result of a “change in conditions” affecting the Tribe’s livelihood.  Id. at 576. 
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Here, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements did not merely affirm and continue rights conferred 
by the 1873 Executive Order, but provided affirmatively that from that point forward the 
Reservation would “be held forever as Indian lands and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene 
Indians,” with no part to “ever be sold, occupied, open to white settlement, or otherwise disposed 
of without the consent of the Indians residing on said reservation.  Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 
989, 1028.  While these provisions were later abrogated by Congress, infra at 11-12, they 
nonetheless represented a fundamental change in the Reservation’s status, particularly when 
coupled with the Tribe’s understanding, as expressed by Chief Seltice, that what the Tribe 
wanted “preserved forever” was “our homes . . . our houses [and] our farms.”  R. 2157. 
Together, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements identify the uses of land that the parties to the 
Agreements mutually encouraged.  In such a case, the seminal decision in Winters establishes 
that intent to reserve water must rest on such purposes.  As discussed at length in the State’s 
opening brief, the Winters decision examined the purposes of the Fort Belknap Reservation by 
looking to the terms of an agreement with the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes (ratified in the 
Act of May 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 113), which established a reduced reservation for the Tribes within 
the boundaries of an earlier, larger, reservation.  The purposes of the reduced Fort Belknap 
reservation were clearly agricultural, while the purpose of the earlier, larger reservation had been 
to provide for the Tribes’ hunting and fishing needs.  See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 (describing 
the earlier reservation as a “larger tract . . .  adequate for the habits and wants of a nomadic and 
uncivilized people”).  The Court ignored the purposes of the earlier reservation, and determined 
the purposes of the Fort Belknap Reservation solely by reference to the 1888 Agreement.  207 
U.S. at 575 (“[t]he case, as we view it, turns on the agreement of May, 1888”).  The Court’s 
reasons were at least partially explained in another decision, where the Court held that the 
ownership of mineral rights in the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, which, like Fort Belknap, had 
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been carved out of the same earlier and more expansive reservation, rested “entirely on the 
agreements or conventions [establishing a new reservation] which were ratified and given effect 
by Congress” because the executive orders establishing the earlier reservation were “designed to 
be temporary” and were “superseded by congressional action and no longer are of any force.”  
British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159, 163 (1936).   
The United States asserts that: 
[I]f the State were correct that a court should look instead to the last federal action 
that changed the boundaries of a reservation when determining the scope of a 
water right for that reservation, the Winters Court would have considered an 1895 
agreement (ratified in 1896) between the United States and the Fort Belknap 
Tribes that reduced the boundaries of the reservation. See Gros Ventre Tribe v. 
United States, 469 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing the Grinnell 
Agreement). 
U.S. Resp. Br. 22.  
Unquestionably, the Winters court, in determining the purposes of the Fort Belknap 
Reservation, looked to the agreement ratified in the 1888 Act, and not the 1895 Grinnel 
Agreement.  This is so because the 1888 Agreement, unlike the 1895 Grinnell Agreement, was a 
change in circumstances that included language clearly establishing the agricultural purposes of 
the reduced reservation by, among other things, directing that money received from the cession 
of lands be used to buy livestock and agricultural implements, to assist Indians in enclosing their 
farms, and “to promote [Tribes’] civilization, comfort, and improvement.”  Act of May 1, 1888, 
Art. III, 25 Stat. 113, 114.  The 1888 Agreement also directed that preference in distribution of 
goods be given to Indians “who in good faith undertake the cultivation of the soil.  Id. at Art. V, 
25 Stat. at 114-15.  The 1895 Grinnel Agreement (ratified in the Act of June 10, 1896, 29 Stat. 
321, 350) ceded additional lands, but did not alter the purposes of the reservation—indeed, it 
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simply confirmed those purposes by repeating, practically word for word, the language in the 
1888 Agreement encouraging agriculture.5    
In short, Winters, by relying on the 1888 Agreement, applied the principle that earlier 
legislation or executive action is superseded by “the enactment of subsequent comprehensive 
legislation establishing elaborate inclusions and exclusions of the person, thing, and relationships 
ordinarily associated with that subject.”  Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 
§ 23:13 (6th ed. 2002).  Likewise, the 1891 Act, in approving the 1887 and 1889 Agreements 
with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, superseded earlier actions by comprehensively addressing, in the 
only documents agreed to by both the Tribe and the United States, the purposes to be served by 
the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.   
2. Intent to Supersede the 1873 Executive Order is Apparent in the Text and 
History of the 1887 and 1889 Agreements. 
The Claimants attempt to avoid the fact that the 1887 and 1889 Agreements are the 
seminal agreements with the Tribe by asserting that the 1873 Executive Order incorporated the 
unratified 1873 Agreement.  Even if this were true, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements still 
superseded the earlier agreement.  The parties to the 1887 and 1889 Agreements did not set out 
to revise the earlier agreement; rather, they negotiated a comprehensive replacement, as can be 
seen in the record of the 1887 negotiations.  The commissioners who negotiated the 1887 
                                                 
5  Compare Act of May 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 113, and Act of June 10, 1896, 29 Stat. 321, 350 
(Grinnel Agreement).  Article III of the 1888 Agreement and Article II of the Grinnel Agreement 
include practically identical directives regarding the expenditure of cession proceeds to buy 
livestock and agricultural implements, to assist Indians in enclosing their farms, and to promote 
the Tribes’ civilization and improvement.  25 Stat. at 114; 29 Stat. at 351.  Article V of the 1888 
Agreement, directing that preference in distribution of goods be given to Indians “who in good 
faith undertake the cultivation of the soil, 25 Stat. at 114-15, is repeated word-for-word in Article 
IV of the Grinnel Agreement.  29 Stat. at 351. 
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Agreement were furnished a copy of the 1873 Agreement, R. 2141, and obviously used it as a 
model: both agreements establish a reservation with identical boundaries; cede all aboriginal 
territory outside that reservation in return for payment; promise to construct a saw and grist mill; 
and promise to provide “articles of comfort and civilization” (1873) or “articles as shall best 
promote the progress, comfort, improvement, education, and civilization of said Coeur d’Alene 
Indians (1887).   R. 1865-66 (1873 Agreement); R. 2187-89 (1887 Agreement).  One glaring 
omission, however, occurs in the 1887 Agreement: the parties did not include the provision from 
the 1873 Agreement stating that “the waters running into said reservation shall not be turned 
from their natural channel where they enter said reservation.”  R. 1865.   
The omission of the provision is significant: “[i]t is a rule of law that where a revising 
statute, or one enacted for another, omits provisions contained in the original act, the parts 
omitted cannot be kept in force by construction, but are annulled.”  Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 
502 (1870).  The 1887 Agreement was clearly enacted in place of the unratified 1873 
Agreement, yet, the district court, by construction, interpreted the purposes of the Reservation to 
incorporate the earlier, superseded provision.  See R. 4322 (citing 1873 provision to “establish 
that one primary purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was to provide the Tribe with the 
important waterways needed to facilitate its traditional hunting and fishing practices”).   
The district court’s error in not fully considering the import of the omission of the 
“running waters” provision from the 1887 Agreement was exacerbated by the fact that Congress 
delayed ratification of the 1887 Agreement until it was able to obtain a cession of many of those 
same “important waterways” that the district court concluded were a primary purpose of the 
Reservation.  R. 4322.  Together, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements, combined with the lack of any 
mention of hunting and fishing needs in either the 1887 or 1889 negotiations, and the repeated 
reference in such negotiations by federal commissioners and tribal representatives of the need to 
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protect tribal farmlands,6 establishes that the primary purpose of the  Reservation that the Tribe 
ultimately bargained-for was to fulfill the Tribe’s agricultural needs.   
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DISALLOW INSTREAM FLOW 
CLAIMS WHERE THE PLACE OF USE IS ON NON-INDIAN FEE LAND.   
Ultimately, with regard to the majority of the instream flow claims, it is not necessary for 
the Court to determine whether the 1891 Act superseded the purposes of the 1873 Executive 
Order, because 15 years later, in 1906, Congress ordered that the Reservation be allotted, and the 
surplus lands sold in fee simple to non-Indians.  Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325.  Ninth 
Circuit case law establishes that the 1906 Act abrogated property rights previously reserved for 
the Tribe.  In the case of Nicodemus v. Washington Water Power Co., 264 F.2d 614 (1959), the 
court was asked to determine whether the Power Company could condemn an easement across a 
tribal allotment.  The allottee argued that condemnation of the easement violated the terms of 
Article 5 of the 1887 Agreement guaranteeing “no part of said reservation shall ever be sold, 
occupied, open to white settlement, or otherwise disposed of without the consent of the Indians 
residing on said reservation.”  Id. at 616 (quoting Art. 5).   
The court held that the allotment “in earlier times was part of the reservation, but 
following the 1906 Act, was “not part of the reservation, nor is it tribal land,” so that the 
allotment was “not land subject to the treaty [i.e., the 1887 Agreement].”  Id. at 617.  The court 
                                                 
6 During the 1887 negotiations, Chief Seltice stated that the things the Tribe wanted 
“preserved forever” were “our homes . . . our houses . . . our fences, our farms, our school-
houses, our churches.”  R. 2157.  In an earlier petition to their Indian agent, Chief Seltice and 
other tribal leaders expressed concerns about rumors that “whites were getting up a petition to 
have the government open the very best portion of our reservation & send us to the other side of 
the St. Joseph river,” and asserted that “[f]rom the land they would take away, we get our food, 
our clothing, & whatever we are in need of[.]  For we till our land, raise crops, keep herds of 
cattle & thus provide for ourselves.”  R. 3399-3400.   
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viewed the 1906 Act as a “change in status,” allowable because “the plenary power of Congress 
over Indian tribes and tribal property cannot be limited by treaties so as to prevent repeal or 
amendment by later statute.”  Id. at 617.  Because the allotment was no longer subject to the 
provisions in the 1887 Agreement, Congress was free to authorize condemnation of an easement 
without tribal consent.  Id. at 617. 
Nicodemus establishes that the 1906 Act was a fundamental change in the Reservation, so 
that tribal property rights in allotted and surplus lands are determined by the 1906 Act and 
related legislation, not by the earlier agreements with the Tribe.  Admittedly, the court’s 
statement that the allotment was no longer “part of the Reservation” was hyperbolic (though 
recently cited by another court as authority7), but the basic holding of Nicodemus remains intact: 
communal property rights conferred or reserved for the Tribe in earlier agreements were 
abrogated by the allotment of the Reservation and the sale of surplus lands.  Indeed, any other 
outcome would be at odds with the purpose underlying allotment and sale of surplus lands, 
which was to make all parcels “fully alienable and free of all charge or incumbrance 
whatsoever.”  Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 
(2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  If allotments held in trust for tribal 
members cease to be “tribal land,” Nicodemus, 264 F.2d at 617, the same must be true for lands 
conveyed to non-Indians, and to water rights whose claimed place of use is on those conveyed 
lands.   
                                                 
7  See United States v. Newmont USA Ltd., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1065-66 (E.D. Wash. 
2007) (quoting Nicodemus, 264 F.2d at 618 for the proposition that “[o]nce allotted in severalty, 
the land was ‘no longer a part of the reservation, nor [was] it tribal land.’”) (addressing land in 
the Spokane Reservation). 
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1. The Place of Use for Instream Flow Claims is the Fish Habitat That the 
Claims Seek to Protect, Not the Downstream Waterways Where Fishing 
Occurs.   
There are twelve non-navigable streams tributary to Coeur d’Alene Lake and the St. Joe 
River that provide spawning and rearing habitat for adfluvial fish harvested in the Lake.8  When 
the Reservation was allotted and opened to non-Indian homesteading in 1906 the lands 
underlying these streams, with the exception of a few scattered parcels, were conveyed in fee to 
non-Indians—the Tribe only retained ownership of submerged lands underlying downstream 
navigable waters—namely a portion of Coeur d’Alene Lake, the lower St. Joe River, and a 
portion of Black Lake.  If this Court concludes that a primary purpose of the Reservation was to 
preserve tribal ownership of fish habitat in Reservation waterways, it must then address the 
consequences of the fact that such ownership did not survive the allotment and opening of the 
Reservation.   
Central to this issue is the nature of the fish habitat water rights claimed by the United 
States and the Tribe.  The United States attempts to downplay the fact that the twelve tributary 
streams flow primarily, and in some cases exclusively, through non-Indian lands.  In the United 
States’ view, “the lands to which the instream flow rights at issue here are linked are the 
                                                 
8  For the reasons explained in the State’s opening brief, this argument is addressed to the 
twelve streams that are tributary to Coeur d’Alene Lake and the St. Joe River:  Claim Nos. 92-
10906 (Cherry Creek), 92-10907 (Alder Creek), 94-9244 (Black Creek), 94-9425 (Willow 
Creek), 94-9246 (Evans Creek), 95-16678 (Fighting Creek), 95-16679 (Lake Creek), 95-16680 
(Plummer Creek), 95-16681 (Little Plummer Creek), 95-16682 (Pedee Creek), 95-16683 
(Benewah Creek), and 95-16684 (Windfall Creek).  Two other claims for Hangman Creek, Nos. 
93-7469 and 93-7470, include substantial stream reaches held in trust for the Tribe or tribal 
members, and may require additional fact-finding to determine the applicability of any holding 
this Court may reach regarding the reservation of instream flows on non-tribal lands.  Because 
the Tribe owns the submerged lands under the lower St. Joe River, any holding based on the 
extinguishment of tribal title to streambeds would not apply to Claim No. 91-7777. 
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downstream Tribal lands where the Tribe conducts its fishing, not the lands across which the 
waters flow.”  U.S. Resp. Br. 26 n.10.  It then asserts that “[i]t is this use of water by the fish 
species subject to the Tribe’s on-Reservation fishing right, and not title to land, that supports a 
claim to impliedly-reserved water rights under Winters.”  U.S. Resp. Br. 28.  See also U.S. Resp. 
Br. 26 (“[t]hese claims are premised on the biological needs of a downstream fishery, not on 
underlying or abutting land ownership”).   
In other words, the United States and Tribe attempt to portray the fish habitat claims as a 
“downstream” water right appurtenant to the tribal lands underlying Coeur d’Alene Lake, and 
assert that “a junior water right holder upstream [cannot] by virtue of land ownership, . . . stop 
the water flowing over his or her land from satisfying the downstream senior right.”  Tribe Resp. 
Br. 31.  Using this convoluted logic, the Tribe asserts that the claimed “water right does not 
require the use of alienated land,” but merely requires the land owners to allow the water to flow 
downstream.  Tribe Resp. Br. 29; see also U.S. Resp. Br. 25 (instream flow claims “derive from 
the Tribe’s uncontested right to fish in Lake Coeur d’Alene and other downstream waterways”); 
U.S. Resp. Br. 26 (“[t]hese claims are premised on the biological needs of a downstream 
fishery”) (emphasis added). 
The reality, however, is that the place of use for these water rights is not the downstream 
tribal waters where the Tribe may exercise its fishing rights.  The place of use is upstream, on 
those waterways flowing over private lands.  This is stated on the face of the claims: the fish 
habitat claim for Plummer Creek (R. 6110), identifies the place of use as “all points along the 
stream reach located between the [stated] boundaries.”  The United States acknowledges that it is 
claiming “in situ water rights [that] allow for the Tribe’s continued traditional activities on 
Reservation waters, which require protecting the upstream habitat upon which the Tribe’s fishery 
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depends.”  U.S. Resp. Br. 6; see also U.S. Resp. Br. 2 (claims “maintain[] biological 
requirements of certain fish species that migrate upstream from Lake Coeur d’Alene to spawn”). 
By definition, the “upstream habitat” that the United States seeks to protect includes both 
the water and the underlying land.  Federal regulations define “essential fish habitat” to include 
“those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to 
maturity,” with “substrate” further defined to include “sediment, hard bottom, structures 
underlying the waters, and associated biological communities.”  50 C.F.R. § 600.10.   
In sum, any analysis of the fish habitat claims must start from the premise that the place 
of use for the claims is not the tribally-owned lakebed where fishing occurs, but the non-Indian 
land on which the fish habitat is present.  By analogy, the Tribe could not claim a reserved water 
right to irrigate non-Indian lands if crops raised thereon were eventually consumed by the Tribe.  
Likewise, the Tribe cannot claim a water right to spawn and rear fish on lands not held in trust 
for the Tribe merely because those fish eventually migrate to a water body where the Tribe may 
harvest them.   
2. The Place of Use for a Reserved Water Right Must be Reserved for the 
Tribe’s Use.   
Because the place of use for the 12 fish habitat claims is the stream bed in which the fish 
are reared, and not the Lake where fish are harvested, the burden is on the United States to 
demonstrate that the stream bed is either held in trust for the Tribe, or is subject to a servitude 
allowing continued entry and use of the stream bed for either fishing or rearing of fish.  The mere 
fact that water was reserved for fishing and fish habitat when the Reservation was first set aside 
for the Tribe’s exclusive use in 1873 is not sufficient because rights implied by the setting aside 
of land for a Tribe’s exclusive use “must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those 
lands.”  Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 561 (1981).   
REPLY BRIEF OF STATE OF IDAHO 
DOCKET NO. 45381-2017  Page 16 
Here, the 1906 Act provides on its face that lands opened to non-Indian homesteading 
were no longer reserved for the Tribe’s use.  The Act identifies the opened lands as “residue or 
surplus lands—that is, lands not allotted or reserved for Indian school, agency, or other 
purposes.”  34 Stat. at 336.  It then provides that a maximum of three sections (1,920 acres) 
could be reserved for “agency, school and religious purposes.”  Id. at 337.  This express 
limitation on “reserved” lands confirms that all lands declared to be “residue or surplus” were 
not reserved for tribal use.  This is additionally confirmed by the provision providing that “all 
coal or oil deposits in or under the lands on the said reservation shall be and remain the property 
of the United States.”  Id. at 336.  The reservation of a specific incident of title implies that all 
other incidents of title were not reserved.    
The 1906 Act is consistent with the general principle that although alienated lands may 
remain part of the Reservation for jurisdictional purposes, all property rights incident to title are 
extinguished upon conveyance to non-Indians, unless reserved explicitly.  See Montana, 450 
U.S. at 565 (conveyance to non-Indians “divested” tribe of right to prevent taking of wildlife); 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993); (loss of title “abrogated” right to regulate 
hunting and fishing by non-Indians); Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(conveyance of reservation lands to non-Indians “cut off or destroyed” tribe’s right to enter to 
hunt and fish).   
The United States and the Tribe assert that cases discussing tribal loss of regulatory 
authority over non-Indian lands are irrelevant, but such assertion ignores the fact that tribal 
regulatory authority is an incident of property ownership and the right to exclude.  Montana, 450 
U.S. at 554.  As such, the cases confirm the general principle that loss of title to reservation lands 
includes all incidents of title unless reserved explicitly.  Moreover, the decision in Montana 
presented a claim analogous to the United States’ claim that the right to fish on tribal lands 
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includes the incidental right to prevent dewatering of fish habitat on private lands.  In Montana, 
the Court recognized that after opening of the reservation, the Crow Tribe retained the right to 
hunt and fish on lands reserved for the Tribe’s use.  Id. at 558.  As the United States does here, 
the Tribe asserted that its retained hunting right included the ancillary right to protect the wildlife 
while on non-Indian lands.  Id. at 564-65.  The Court’s rejection of the asserted, ancillary right is 
equally applicable here: the Tribe’s right to fish on tribally-owned waterways does not imply the 
right to protect fish, or by extension fish habitat, once those fish leave tribal lands.   
Moreover, the Supreme Court has not limited the loss of incidental rights to regulatory 
rights: the Court has held that other incidental property rights, such as the “right to fish free of 
state interference,” are lost when reservation land is alienated to non-Indians.  Puyallup Tribe, 
Inc. v. Dept. of Game of State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 174 (1977) (Puyallup III).  Likewise, the 
Ninth Circuit has held that the alienation of reservation lands to non-Indians abrogates the 
incidental property right of entry to hunt or fish.  Blake, 663 F.2d at 911.  The same principle 
applies to reserved water rights: once land “is conveyed to a homesteader, the purposes for which 
Winters rights were implied are eliminated,” because the conveyed land is no longer subject to 
tribal use.  United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d. 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1984).  This principle 
was applied in the Big Horn adjudication, where the court, discussing reserved water rights for 
irrigation, held that the “[w]hen the Tribes ceded their land to the United States for sale, the 
reserved water right disappeared because the purpose for which it was recognized no longer 
pertained.”).  In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River 
System, 899 P.2d 848, 854 (Wyo. 1995).  
To counter this overwhelming precedent, the United States and the Tribe cite two cases, 
State v. McConville, 65 Idaho 46, 139 P.2d 485 (Idaho 1943), and Menominee Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), as support for the assertion that when lands are sold in fee to 
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non-Indians, the Tribe retains the right to use such lands as necessary to achieve the purposes of 
the Reservation unless Congress acts explicitly to abrogate such rights.  Tribe Resp. Br. 35-36; 
U.S. Resp. Br. 26, 29.  Both cases are easily distinguished.  In McConville, this Court was not 
addressing an implied fishing right, but rather an express treaty fishing right that, as the Court 
noted, was explicitly reserved “in full force and effect” by the Act opening the Nez Perce 
Reservation to non-Indian settlement.  65 Idaho at 51, 139 P.2d at 487 (quoting Art. XI of Act of 
Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 331).  No analogous reservation of rights appears in the 1906 Act 
opening the Coeur d’Alene Reservation to homesteading.  
In Menominee Tribe of Indians, the question presented was whether the Tribe’s hunting 
and fishing rights, implied from the setting aside of a reservation for the Tribe’s exclusive use, 
survived the termination of the Wolf River Reservation.  The Menominee Termination Act was 
unique, however, in that the former reservation lands were conveyed in fee simple to the Tribe.  
391 U.S. at 408-09.  Thus, the Menominee Tribe continued to own and occupy the same land 
before and after the Termination Act, and the only question was whether Congress had abrogated 
the Tribe’s right to hunt, free of state regulation, on land owned by the Tribe.   
Neither McConville nor Menominee contradict cases holding that the conveyance of 
reservation lands to non-Indians without a reservation of rights is an explicit indication of 
congressional intent to abrogate incidental property rights implied from the setting aside of lands 
for a tribe’s exclusive use.  In such cases, the Supreme Court has held that conveyance of tribal 
lands to non-Indians is an “abrogation” of the “right of exclusive use and occupation,” and “[t]he 
abrogation of this greater right” implies the loss of rights implied from the reservation of 
exclusive use.  Bourland, 508 U.S. at 688-89 (discussing loss of implied right of regulatory 
authority); see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (congressional act 
directing sale of reservation’s surplus lands despite earlier treaty requiring tribal consent to any 
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sale was exercise of congress’ power to abrogate treaty provisions).  Likewise, in Blake v. Arnett, 
663 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1981), the court concluded that the tribe’s fishing right, implied by 
the setting aside of land for the tribe’s exclusive use, was extinguished on those reservation lands 
sold to non-Indians.  Tellingly, the court rejected the tribal members’ argument that the holding 
in Menominee compelled the conclusion that their fishing rights survived on alienated lands.  Id.  
Here, the Tribe attempts to avoid the consequences of alienation by analogizing its claims 
to the State’s possession of minimum stream flow water rights, which include water flowing over 
land the State does not own.  State minimum stream flows do not, by implication, support the 
Tribe’s claims, because the State’s police powers over water and fish are not limited to lands 
owned by the State. “‘[P]rotection of the wild life of the State is peculiarly within the police 
power, and the State has great latitude in determining what means are appropriate for its 
protection.”  Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 391 (1978) (quoting 
Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 552 (1924).  “[A] State's power to 
regulate the use of water in times and places of shortage . . . is at the core of its police power.”  
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353, 366 n.6 (1992); 
Speer v. Stephenson, 16 Idaho 707, 712, 102 P. 365, 367 (1909) (Idaho Constitution “reserv[es] 
to the state the right to regulate and control the manner and means of appropriating the 
unappropriated waters of the state”).  In contrast, a tribe’s power to regulate the use of natural 
resources arises from its power to exclude: when title to reservation lands is conveyed in fee to 
non-Indians, tribal authority to restrict use of the resources for purposes of conservation 
generally ceases.  Montana, 450 U.S. at 558-59; see also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 
438, 456 (1997) (a tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction is generally limited to lands over which tribe 
can “assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude”).  Hence, the fact that the State may, 
through its police powers, conserve waters flowing over private land does not support the Tribe’s 
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claims; if anything, it demonstrates why they must be denied.  The United States and Tribe 
nonetheless press this Court to craft an exception for non-consumptive fish habitat water rights 
flowing exclusively, or nearly so, through non-Indian lands.  The precedents they cite do not 
support such a radical expansion of the reserved water rights doctrine.  Fish habitat water rights 
have been recognized only where the tribe had an underlying property right, either in the form of 
ownership or a servitude, to use the stream at the designated place of use for fishing or fish 
rearing.   
For example, in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, the Tribe “claim[ed] a reserved 
right for water to maintain the spawning grounds in the creek.”  460 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325 
(E.D. Wash. 1978).  The spawning grounds were in the lower section of the creek.  See Colville 
Confederated Tribes v. Walton 647 F.2d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[t]he Indians cultivated No 
Name Creek's lower reach to establish spawning grounds”).  The court took care to note that the 
lower section of the creek ran through three allotments held in trust by the United States “that 
had never passed from tribal ownership”  647 F.2d at 45 n.5; see also 460 F. Supp. at 1336 (map 
of lower allotments).  The award of water was only to “maintain the spawning grounds.”  460 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1325.  No water was awarded to protect habitat on those portions of the creek 
running through private lands.  Thus, Walton is consistent with the premise that the place of use 
for an instream flow must be either owned by a tribe or subject to a servitude allowing tribal use 
of the stream bed for fishing or fish rearing.  
Reliance on United States v. Anderson as precedent for decreeing instream flow water 
rights to preserve fish habitat on non-Indian lands is likewise misplaced.  Anderson affirmed a 
reserved water right “needed to preserve fishing in the creek below Chamokane Falls.”  591 F. 
Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Wash. 1982).  The reach in question was a mile and a half in length.  Id. at 4.  
The appellate decision indicates that “land owned in fee occupied most of the waterfront 
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property within the reservation,” 736 F.2d 1358, 1366 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984).  The reported 
Anderson decisions do not identify whether the Tribe retained ownership of the creek bed (as 
opposed to the “waterfront” property), but an earlier, unreported decision in the case found that 
the “Spokanes had reserved the exclusive right to take fish from the part of Chamokane Creek 
contained within the reservation.”9   
Thus, at a minimum, the Tribe retained a property right, in the form of a servitude,10 
reserving the exclusive right to take fish from Chamokane Creek, and the place of use for the 
water right was limited to the lower reach where the tribal fishing right was exercised.  591 F. 
Supp. at 5 (“the flow from the Falls into Lower Chamokane Creek must be sufficient to maintain 
the water temperature at 68°F or below”).  Thus, Anderson does not support the award of 
instream flows along stream reaches where the place of use is not subject to a servitude allowing 
entry and use for tribal fishing. 
The case that is perhaps most irrelevant to the current claims is United States v. Adair, 
723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).  The court recognized an instream flow fish habitat water right on 
a river that flowed primarily through non-Indian (though mostly federally-held) lands within the 
terminated Klamath Indian Reservation.  The basis for the court’s decision recognizing instream 
flows independent of tribal ownership were two provisions in the Klamath Termination Act 
explicitly preserving on former tribal lands all fishing rights and water rights held by the Tribe 
pursuant to earlier treaties: 
                                                 
9  United States v. Anderson, No. 72-cv-3643, Memorandum Opinion and Order (E.D. 
Wash., July 23, 1979).  A copy of the relevant portions of the Memorandum Opinion is included 
in the Addendum to this brief.   
10  See United States v Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (treaty right preserving right to 
fish at usual and accustomed places “imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as though 
described therein”). 
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(a) Nothing in this Act shall abrogate any water rights of the tribe and its 
members . . . . 
(b) Nothing in this Act shall abrogate any fishing rights or privileges of the tribe 
or the members thereof enjoyed under Federal treaty. 
Act of Aug. 13, 1954, §14, 68 Stat. 718, 722.11  
In Adair, the State of Oregon argued that “recognition of a reserved water right to sustain 
the Tribe's hunting and fishing rights would impose a servitude or limitation on the use of former 
reservation lands in contravention of the Termination Act policy of unencumbered sale.”  723 
F.2d at 1411.  The court, citing the Termination Act’s express disclaimer of intent to abrogate 
water rights, rejected the argument that termination of tribal ownership extinguished water rights 
for hunting and fishing: 
Appellants' argument, however, overlooks the substantive language of the 
Termination Act, the canons of construction for legislation affecting Indian 
Tribes, and the implications of our decision in Kimball I.12  Section 564m(a) of 
the Termination Act provides, “[n]othing in sections 564–564w of this title shall 
abrogate any water rights of the tribe and its members.” 25 U.S.C. § 564m(a) 
(1976).  This provision admits no exception, nor can it be read to exclude reserved 
water rights.  Congress presumably was aware of the importance of such rights to 
Indian tribes at the time it drafted section 564m of the Klamath Termination Act.  
A conclusion that the Termination Act ended the Klamath’s hunting and fishing 
water rights would impute to Congress the intention to abrogate rights guaranteed 
to the Tribe in the 1864 Treaty.  As the Supreme Court noted in Menominee Tribe 
v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 1711, 20 L.Ed.2d 697 (1968), 
it is “difficult to believe that Congress, without explicit statement, would subject 
the United States to a claim for compensation by destroying property rights 
conferred by treaty.”  Because Congress in section 564m of the Termination Act 
explicitly protected tribal water rights and nowhere in the Act explicitly denied 
them, we can only conclude that such rights survived termination. 
                                                 
11 The Adair decision refers to this provision by its then-existing codification, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 564m.   
12  In Kimball I (Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974)), the court had 
determined that the treaty reservation of the exclusive right to fish within the Reservation 
“include[d], in addition, a grant of exclusive hunting and trapping rights.”  Adair, 723 F.2d at 
1409.   
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Adair, 723 F.2d at 1412 (additional citations omitted) (emphasis added).  The court’s repeated 
citation of the provision disclaiming intent to abrogate water rights demonstrates that the 
provision was central to the court’s holding.  Such provision overcame the general principle that 
sales of reservation land to non-Indians are intended to “make perfect title to purchasers,” Ash 
Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1920), so that no tribal property rights are 
retained on conveyed lands.   
Contrary to the arguments of the United States and the Tribe, the holding in Adair does 
not support the assertion that reserved water rights for hunting and fishing would survive 
allotment and opening of a reservation to non-Indian homesteading.  While a quarter of the 
Klamath Reservation had been allotted, 723 F.2d at 1398, with some allotments later sold to non-
Indians, the Reservation had never been opened to homesteading.  Thus, the Adair court never 
had occasion to determine whether an act opening a reservation to homesteading would preserve 
water rights for hunting and fishing if such act lacked an express reservation of water rights 
analogous to that in the Termination Act.  Moreover, the holding in Adair that water rights were 
retained for hunting and fishing throughout the terminated reservation was partially based on an 
earlier decision holding that the Termination Act preserved hunting and fishing rights on all 
former reservation lands, including allotments that had been earlier conveyed to non-Indians.  
In the earlier case, Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kimball II) the 
court distinguished the holding in Puyallup III that fishing rights implied from the reservation of 
lands for a tribe’s exclusive use are lost upon sale of allotments to non-Indians, citing the 
provisions in the Klamath Termination Act that preserved hunting and fishing rights “on the 
lands constituting the ancestral Klamath Indian Reservation.”  Id. at 774.  In short, the court 
concluded that the Tribe retained hunting and fishing rights on all former reservation lands, with 
no distinction between hunting rights on former allotments and hunting rights on lands acquired 
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through the Termination Act, other than to note that on private lands the hunting right would be 
non-exclusive.  Id.  The Kimball II holding explains the subsequent holding in Adair recognizing 
instream flows throughout the ancestral reservation without regard to land ownership, because 
“even where the Tribe transfers the land to which the hunting and fishing water rights might be 
said to be appurtenant, it is the Tribe and its members, not some third party, that retains the right 
to hunt and fish and needs water to support that right.”  723 F.2d at 1418 n.31.  Because the 
opening of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation lacks any provisions similar to those in the Klamath 
Termination Act preserving hunting and fishing rights on former tribal lands, the reasoning of 
the Adair court is inapplicable here.  
Because Adair applied provisions unique to the Termination Act, the decision in Blake v. 
Arnett, 663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981), provides better guidance on whether rights implied from 
the primary purpose of a reservation survive the opening of the reservation to homesteading.  
Blake addressed the Klamath River Indian Reservation in California.  The Reservation, which 
extended “one mile in width on each side of the Klamath river for a distance of approximately 20 
miles up river,” was clearly set aside for the purpose of providing fishing access to the Klamath 
River, although the Executive Order creating the Reservation made no mention of fishing rights.  
Id. at 911.  Earlier litigation had held that the right to fish was implied from the purposes of the 
Reservation.  Arnett v. Five Gill Nets, 121 Cal. Rptr. 906, 911 (Ct. App. 1975).   
Despite the clear tie between the implied fishing right and the primary purpose of the 
Reservation, the court held that once the reservation was allotted, and surplus lands opened to 
homesteading, the Tribe’s right to use the lands for the reservation’s fishing purpose was 
extinguished.  663 F.2d. at 910.  In so holding, the court rejected the tribe’s assertion that it 
retained “some interest in the lands now held” by non-Indians, whether in the “form of an 
equitable servitude” or other encumbrance.  Id.   
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Blake is dispositive.  Once the twelve streams on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation were 
alienated to homesteaders, the Tribe lost the right to use those lands to fulfill the purposes of the 
Reservation, a fact the United States and the Tribe do not dispute. 13  If the Tribe lost the right to 
use the stream bed (which is a critical part of fish habitat) to fulfill reservation purposes, it 
likewise lost any water right implied by those same purposes.  If anything, this principle was 
affirmed in Adair.  The retention of a fishing right on former reservation lands meant those lands 
could still be used to fulfill the reservation’s hunting and fishing purposes.  But, “[w]here the 
Tribe transfers lands without reserving the right to hunt and fish on it, there is no longer any 
basis for a hunting and fishing water right.” Adair, 723 F.2d at 1418 n.31.   
In short, a water right may be implied to fulfill reservation purposes on alienated lands 
only where the Tribe retains the right to enter and use the place of use for one of the 
reservation’s primary purposes.  Nothing in Adair, Anderson or Walton suggests that retention of 
a tribal right to fish in a downstream waterway reserves all upstream fish habitat, and associated 
water rights, for the Tribe’s use.  To so hold would essentially reverse the implied-reservation-
of-water doctrine to imply a right to use underlying land based on a reservation of water rights, 
rather than implying a right to use water based on a reservation of land.   
The remaining cases cited by the United States and the Tribe in support of instream flow 
water rights on non-tribal lands are distinguishable for the same reasons discussed in the State’s 
response brief in Appeal Nos. 45382 and 45383, and are only addressed summarily here.  To 
                                                 
13 U.S. Resp. Br. at 32 (“the instream flow rights claimed here are not based on any 
purported right to fish on private land.  These rights are claimed to support fish populations 
harvested by the Tribe on tribal lands only”); Tribe Resp. Br. 38 (“this case does not involve 
issues related to a right of access or any other property interest on non-Indian land.  As discussed 
above, the Tribe claims a non-consumptive use right to maintain instream flows in water that 
flows over non-Indian land to support fish habitat for the fish the Tribe harvests on Tribal land 
within the Reservation”). 
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start, reliance on Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th 
Cir. 1985), is misplaced.  The decision upheld a federal district court’s retained authority under a 
prior consent decree to order the temporary release from a federal irrigation project to prevent 
dewatering of 60 salmon redds.  Id. at 1033-35.  No reserved water rights were recognized or 
awarded. 
Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1964), does not support the award of water 
rights on non-tribal lands.  The Court awarded water rights for the Cocopah Indian Reservation, 
a portion of which was two miles from the Colorado River, but, another part of the reservation 
was “bordered on the west by the meander line of the Colorado River as shown by a public land 
survey made in 1874.” R. 2938 (Solicitor Opinion); R. 3495 (plat showing Reservation bordering 
Colorado River meander line).  Moreover, the place of use, unlike here, was held by the United 
States in trust for the tribe.   
In Dep’t. of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrig. Dist., 850 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1993), (the 
appeal from the Acquavella Adjudication), the court recognized a reservation of water rights for 
fish habitat on off-reservation lands, but such recognition was the result of an agreement among 
“[a]ll the parties to this litigation that the Yakima Indians . . . were entitled to water for the 
preservation of fishing rights.”  Id. at 1317.  Also, the Tribe retained a servitude allowing it to 
enter the place of use by virtue of a treaty right to fish at all usual and accustomed places.  
Winans, 198 U.S at 381. 
The United States’ and Tribe’s repeated references to this Court’s decision in Joyce 
Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.2d 502 (2007), do not support their assertion 
that use of the water by fish eventually harvested by the Tribe is a sufficient basis for a reserved 
water right in streams not owned by the Tribe.  In Joyce Livestock the Court found that ranchers 
could hold water rights on lands not owned by them based on the fact that their cattle used the 
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water.  But Joyce Livestock is distinguishable for two reasons: first, the ranchers owned the cattle 
that were using the water.  Here, the Tribe does not own the fish.  The tribal property interest in 
the fish ceases once those fish leave tribally-owned lands, as demonstrated by the holding in 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 561, that the Crow Tribe had no legal right to prevent the 
taking of wildlife on non-Indian lands within the reservation.  Second, the ranchers in Joyce 
Livestock, while not the owners of the federal lands where water use was occurring, had a right 
to enter and use the lands by means of a federal grazing permit.  Here, the United States and the 
Tribe admit they do not possess the right to enter and use the place of use for these twelve water 
rights.  U.S. Resp. Br. 32 (“the Tribe makes not claim of a right to fish on non-tribal lands”). 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 
2013), suggested that reserved water rights could exist outside the bounds of a federal 
reservation in Alaska, but no water rights were awarded or recognized in that case.  John 
addressed the validity of a federal regulation implementing the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2371 (Nov. 12, 1980) (ANILCA).  The regulation defined the scope 
of “public lands” in Alaska to include appurtenant reserved water rights.  The Court approved the 
agencies’ determination that under the reserved water rights doctrine “appurtenant” waters 
“included “all navigable and non-navigable water within the exterior boundaries of the [land 
units] and on inland waters adjacent to the exterior boundaries of the [land units]”  720 F.3d at 
1222 (brackets in original).  Because the regulatory definition of “public lands” to include 
appurtenant waters was used only to determine the scope of a subsistence hunting priority for 
rural Alaska residents, and had no impact on other water users, the court had no occasion to 
apply the Supreme Court’s admonishment in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700-01 
(1978), requiring “careful examination” of purpose and need before implying a reservation of 
water.  The regulation at issue simply assumed “all” waters were reserved.  John, 720 F.3d at 
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1222.  And, the usefulness of the court’s holding for determining the scope of reserved water 
rights is questionable at best, given the following admission: 
[P]revious applications of the federal reserved water rights doctrine have focused 
on the amount of water needed for a specific federal reservation, rather than the 
locations of water sources that might generally be needed for subsistence living 
from many such reservations.  We, and perhaps the Secretaries, failed to 
recognize the difficulties in applying the federal reserved water rights doctrine in 
this novel way, and in retrospect the doctrine may provide a particularly poor 
mechanism for identifying the geographic scope of ANILCA's rural subsistence 
priority management when it comes to water.  
720 F.2d at 1226.   
More importantly, John dealt with an unqualified reservation of federal lands, with no 
history comparable to the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, by which reserved lands were alienated to 
homesteaders or otherwise sold in fee simple.  The presence of such expressions of intent to 
extinguish tribal interests in ceded or conveyed lands make John inapplicable.  This is amply 
demonstrated by the fact that in John, the Ninth Circuit readily implied a right to exercise federal 
authority over off-reservation water resources to benefit the purposes of the reservation.  But, the 
same court had refused to do so in the context of Indian reservations.  In Gros Ventre Tribe v. 
United States, 469 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2006), the Tribe asserted that the United States had violated 
its trust obligations to the Tribe by permitting a gold mine on former tribal lands that had 
affected the quantity and quality of water used by the Tribe.  The Tribe asserted that in its 
agreements with the Tribe, “the government has committed itself to specific fiduciary obligations 
in the management of water resources existing off of the Reservation.”  Id. at 812.  The court 
refused to imply “a duty to regulate third-party use of non-Indian resources for the benefit of the 
Tribes,” because “nowhere do we find the government ‘unambiguously agreeing’ to manage off-
Reservation resources for the benefit of the Tribe.”  Id. at 812-13.   
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Gros Ventre confirms the central premise of the State’s appeal: when title to lands is 
conveyed to non-Indians, the Court cannot imply the reservation of a right to preserve natural 
resources on such lands for the Tribe’s benefit.  Such a reservation of rights must be expressed 
unambiguously.  Here, no such right was expressed, and water rights for the purpose of 
protecting fish habitat must be disallowed for all places of use not held in trust for the Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe.   
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The State requests that this case be remanded to the district court with an order to 
disallow all claims for reserved water rights for hunting and fishing purposes. In the event this 
Court denies such relief, the State requests, alternatively, that this case be remanded to the 
district court with an order to disallow all instream flows on those twelve non-navigable streams 
within the Reservation that flow entirely, or primarily, through non-Indian fee lands, as identified 
in footnote 7 herein, with remand for additional consideration as to the applicability of such 
holding with regard to Claim Nos. 93-7469 and 93-7470 for fish habitat water rights in Hangman 
Creek.   
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.IIJL 23 \g]9 
J. R. FALLQUIST, Clerlt 
______ ...,eput)'. 
The United States brought this action on its own 
behalf and as trustee for the Spokane Tribe of Indians to 
adjudi·cate the rights in and to the llaters of Chamokane,~ 
l;~.e.ek)and -i·ts tributaries. The Court permitted the Spoltane 
Tribe to intervene as a plaintiff. Defendants include the 
State of Washington in its governmental and proprietary j 
capacities and all other persons and corporations that claim I 
·an interest in the waters of Chamokane Creek. its tributaries,! 
br its groundwater basin.!/ Jurisdiction lies in this Court 
under 28 U.S.C. 1134S. 
All parties to the litigation claim water in the 
1/ ln this opinion, the term 11ChaT:?ot.ane basin" is 
I 
used below-to refer tDthe entire system, inc:ludinp the 
creek its tributaries, and its y.round water basin. 





























Sec. 34. TZBN. NE 1/4, E 1/2 SE 1/4 7/16/45 15 
RJ9E Tl012 
Sec. 21. T29N. Lot& 5 &·7, E 1/2 2/2/42 20 
R40E SW 1/4, E 1/2 SE 1/4 
. 
T 1001 
Se.c. 31 •. T29N. NW 1/4. W 1/2 NE 1/4 2/2/42 110 
R40E· TlOOl 
Sec. 2. T27N, Lots 6 & 9. NE 1/4 2/2/42 48 
R39E NW 1/4. S l/2 NW 1/4, 
NW 1/4 SY 1/4. T 1001 
In conclusion. this Court recognizes reserved 
vater rights for irrigation of lands within the Chamokane 
I basin on the Spokane Indian Reservation in the following 
I :::::•:cr::.:i:: :::..:dr:::::.::•::t: ;r:7.b::in 
I
I! each year for irrigation of the 7,898 irrigable acres with a 
·' priority date of August 18. 1877, the dat;e of the creation 
of the reservalion. _For the 562 reacquired irrigable acres 






of 1,686 acre-feet of water each year with a priority date 
of the date of reacquisition. 
2. Reserved Yater Rights for fishing 
Plaintiffs also assert a reserved right to suffi-
cient water to preserve fish in the Creek. They therefore 
claim that one of the purposes for creating the ~pokane 
Indian Reservation was to insure the Spokane Indians access 
to fishing areas and to fish for food. ~. !..:.B.!.• United 
_ States v. Winans. 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
The Court finds that maintenance of the creek for 
fishing vas a purpose for creating the reservation. The 
United States acknowledged the importance of Chamokane Creek 
to the Spokane Indians by 5etting the eastern boundary of 
the reservation at the eastern bank of the creek. thus in-
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eluding the breadth of the waten.ray within the reservation. 
Fish remain a ataple food in the diet of the Spokane Indiana. 
The Spokanes hav~ reserved the exclusive right to take fish 
from the part of Chamokane Creek contained within the reserva-
tion. and many I~dians catch and use the native trout as a 
food source. 
-The Court therefore holds that the Tribe has the 
reserved right.,to sufficient wat:er to preserve fi&hing in 
Chamokane Creek. 
The Court finds that the quantity of water needed 
I 
to carry out.the reserved fishing purposes is related to 
I
• water temperature rather than simply to minimum flov. The 
native trout:cannot survive at a water t~mperature in excess 
i of 6B•F. The minimum flow from the falls into Lower Chamokane 
I 
I Creek which will maintain the water at 68°F varies. but is 
.I at least 20 cfs. The Court therefore ho~ds that the plain-
~ tiffs have a rlserved right to sufficient water to maintain 
~ • the water temperature below the falls at 68°F or less, 
1 
l 
provided that at no time sha~l the flow past the falls be 
less than 20 cfs. 
A;though the usual priority date for reserved 
water rights is the date of the crea~ion of the reservation, 
I 
I 
the priority date for the water reserved for fishing uses 
arguably is even earlier. The Spokane Indians have used 
this creek .for fishing purposes since "'time immemorial.'' and 
therefore they claim a reserved water right with a priority i 
_date of "time immemorial." 
The pricrit:y date for reserved water for fishing 
~-
~ at the latest i; the date of the creation of the reservation, 
~ 
i' I 
and the Court need not rule on whether the p~iority date is 
"time immemorial." Under either priority date, the Tribe's 
reserved water rights for fishing uses are auperior to any 
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